Investment Institute
Actualización de mercados

Déjà Vu


Core bond yields are back to where they were in the first half of the first decade of the new millennium – and there are parallels with the situation in 2006-2007, the last time rates were kept high for a long period of time. But it’s the differences that are perhaps more important. Global growth is weaker, and confidence has been eroded` by the pandemic and energy shocks. Since the Federal Reserve (Fed) raised rates to what many believe will be the peak, markets have delivered negative returns, in contrast to what happened in 2006. That period ended badly - after more than three years of hawkish policy - with the global financial crisis in 2008. There might be a case for central banks to cut rates soon before it is too late.

Rule The World 

I was already working at AXA Investment Managers in 2007, the last time US Treasury yields were as high as they are today. Obviously, I didn’t know what was ahead – the near collapse of the global financial system – but it didn’t seem such a bad time. Rihanna’s “Umbrella” topped the UK pop charts in the spring, Take That reformed and Manchester United added their 16th English Football League title. Interest rates were at a peak in the US, the UK and the Eurozone, reflecting central banks’ desire to reverse the inflation caused by the global economic recovery that followed the dot-com recession. High bond yields meant decent income returns for fixed income investors. According to the ICE-Bank of America bond indices, annual income returns for US Treasury investors averaged around 4.75% between 2005 and 2007. Income returns for gilt investors were a little higher. Following the global financial crisis and the beginning of quantitative easing, bond yields were driven lower by central bank purchases and income returns fell to less than 2.5% per year for Treasuries from 2010 onwards.

Time to manage risk?

Both the Fed and the European Central Bank (ECB) kept interest rates at the then peak of the cycle for over a year – the Fed between June 2006 and September 2007 and the ECB between June 2007 and November 2008. There were similarities between the economic backdrop then and the one that prevails now. Inflation was too high for central banks; labour markets were tight and economic activity seemed – for a while at least – to be somewhat immune to the tightening of monetary conditions. The differences were that China’s economy was growing at more than 10% per year in the mid-2000s and there was a lot of leverage around that had propelled global house prices to dizzying levels. Today, the global economy continues to be somewhat impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, at its height in 2020-2021, and the energy shock of 2022. It is not in great shape and markets are beginning to reflect that. There is a case for central banks acting soon – by cutting rates - to avoid what might be a negative outcome at the end of this cycle.

The pushback against that approach is, of course, that inflation remains too high. In 2006-2007 the Fed ultimately responded to weak growth and the financial crisis. Inflation accelerated again in 2008, before collapsing in 2009. Central banks can’t fine tune, but they can risk manage, and markets are suggesting that current policy settings are not optimal. Inflation breakevens are stable. Cutting rates today would signal active risk management - it would not by itself trigger an acceleration of inflation.

The peak is here, but losses are mounting

Today, markets are not performing well relative to the expectations of what would happen once central banks got to peak rates. Since the Fed raised the Fed Funds Rate to 5.25%-5.50% on 26 July, global equities have lost around 6% and US Treasuries have had a negative total return of 3.6%. Short-duration fixed income and high yield have been flat, and these were asset classes that performed well during the early phase of the peak rates period in 2006. To my knowledge, the only indices with a positive return since the Fed decision are US leveraged loans, European high yield, and UK index-linked bonds (which of course had their rate shock a year ago).

Three in a row?

We seem to be in a worse situation than in 2006-2007. Growth is weaker and consensus forecasts are for major economies to flirt with recession next year. There are questions over whether there has been enough of a tightening of monetary policy to return inflation to target. At the very least markets are resetting both their expectations of how long rates will remain this high and that rates, on average, will be higher going forward than they were during the 2010-2021 period. Both the growth backdrop and the expectations of rate resetting are undermining investment returns. Investor confidence is weak. Fixed income investors potentially face their third consecutive year of negative total returns.   

Curve dis-inversion is painful

For the first year of rates being at their peak in 2006-2007, 10-year Treasury yields traded in a range of 4.5% to 5.25%. That is slightly above where we are today but was consistent at the time with nominal GDP growth expectations. Total returns were 5.4%, driven by income. Today, the market really needs to stabilise to get a similar outcome. The problem in the near term is that the curve is flattening but it is a bearish flattening, coming from a very inverted position. Most of the adjustment is coming from higher 10-year yields with two-year yields rising too, reflecting the ‘new normal’ for medium-term interest rates. It was easier for bonds to perform well in 2006 because the yield curve was nowhere near as inverted as it has been this cycle.

Things change

After a year of rates being at 5.25% and three years after the Fed started hiking in 2004, risk sentiment started to crack in the summer of 2007. The housing market was falling, and mortgage delinquencies were rising. Treasuries and other long-duration bonds started to perform well from the middle of 2007. In the final three months before the Fed cut rates in September 2007, there were more and more signs of economic moderation and financial stress. Treasuries posted a total return of 4.5% with the over 10-year sector registering a gain of 6.7%. Meanwhile, high yield returns turned negative. Equity returns started to go negative and became deeply so for European markets as they were caught between the US heading into recession and the ECB keeping rates very restrictive. History rhyming?

Rhymes and echoes

The lessons from 2006-2007 are that the lags between the beginning of monetary tightening and the economy responding are long and unpredictable and that when policy does eventually pivot, it does so quickly. Even as late as the Federal Open Market Committee’s June 2007 meeting, the policymakers’ statement talked about inflation not moderating being the biggest risk, even as it was clear that the housing market was in big trouble. And finally, the lesson is that once markets turn, they turn violently. US equities lost 18% in the year after the September 2007 rate cut and a further 33% in the following six months. US 10-year yields fell from a peak of 5.3% in June 2007 to 2.1% in May 2009. They went on to another decade of trend decline before bottoming at 0.5% in 2020.  

A pivot to stabilise returns?

There are potential triggers to a big risk-off and bond rally market. The potential for a US government shutdown will impact aggregate demand, as well as business and household confidence. A downward spiral in activity could follow. The current tightening of financial conditions – higher bond yields, a tighter dollar and weaker stock prices – might accelerate the impact of the tightening in the pipeline on vulnerable parts of the economy. The labour market does not yet appear to be weakening – at least according to government figures – but the Fed cut rates in September 2007 when the unemployment rate was still very close to its cyclical low and non-farm payroll growth had continued to be positive (although subsequent revisions showed payrolls fell in July and August 2007).

Looking back at that earlier visit to Table Mountain it is hard not to conclude that this cycle could end with a sharp slowdown in growth and even a recession. Such a scenario would benefit assets perceived as ‘safe’ – even if the US does suffer another ratings downgrade – and high yield and equity markets could experience some significant losses. Moreover, unemployment would rise and living standards would be hit further. To avoid this outcome, there is an argument that the Fed should cut rates now and that such an action should be followed by cuts in Europe where growth is stalling, and in the UK, which will suffer if the US and Eurozone go into recession. There is enough in current market price action to suggest that things are not entirely alright and that monetary policy needs to pivot.

(Performance data/data sources: Refinitiv Datastream, Bloomberg, as of 27 September 2023). Past performance should not be seen as a guide to future returns.

Artículos relacionados

Actualización de mercados

Finanzas en 2 minutos: El BCE vuelve a bajar tipos y la inflación estadounidense repunta

Actualización de mercados

Record highs, positive sentiment – what could possibly go wrong?

Actualización de mercados

Finanzas en 2 minutos: El crecimiento mundial se mantendrá estable en 2025 antes de desacelerarse; la actividad en la zona euro se encuentra en su nivel más bajo de los últimos 10 meses

    Disclaimer

    Este documento tiene fines informativos y su contenido no constituye asesoramiento financiero sobre instrumentos financieros de conformidad con la MiFID (Directiva 2014/65 / UE), recomendación, oferta o solicitud para comprar o vender instrumentos financieros o participación en estrategias comerciales por AXA Investment Managers Paris, S.A. o sus filiales.

    Las opiniones, estimaciones y previsiones aquí incluidas son el resultado de análisis subjetivos y pueden ser modificados sin previo aviso. No hay garantía de que los pronósticos se materialicen.

    La información sobre terceros se proporciona únicamente con fines informativos. Los datos, análisis, previsiones y demás información contenida en este documento se proporcionan sobre la base de la información que conocemos en el momento de su elaboración. Aunque se han tomado todas las precauciones posibles, no se ofrece ninguna garantía (ni AXA Investment Managers Paris, S.A. asume ninguna responsabilidad) en cuanto a la precisión, la fiabilidad presente y futura o la integridad de la información contenida en este documento. La decisión de confiar en la información presentada aquí queda a discreción del destinatario. Antes de invertir, es una buena práctica ponerse en contacto con su asesor de confianza para identificar las soluciones más adecuadas a sus necesidades de inversión. La inversión en cualquier fondo gestionado o distribuido por AXA Investment Managers Paris, S.A. o sus empresas filiales se acepta únicamente si proviene de inversores que cumplan con los requisitos de conformidad con el folleto y documentación legal relacionada.

    Usted asume el riesgo de la utilización de la información incluida en este documento/ material audiovisual. La información incluida en este documento/ material audiovisual se pone a disposición exclusiva del destinatario para su uso interno, quedando terminantemente prohibida cualquier distribución o reproducción, parcial o completa por cualquier medio de este material sin el consentimiento previo por escrito de AXA Investment Managers Paris, S.A.

    La información aquí contenida está dirigida únicamente a clientes profesionales tal como se establece en los artículos 194 y 196 de la Ley 6/2023, de 17 de marzo, de los Mercados de  Valores y de los Servicios de Inversión.

    Queda prohibida cualquier reproducción, total o parcial, de la información contenida en este documento.

    Por AXA Investment Managers Paris, S.A., sociedad de derecho francés con domicilio social en Tour Majunga, 6 place de la Pyramide, 92800 Puteaux, inscrita en el Registro Mercantil de Nanterre con el número 393 051 826. En otras jurisdicciones, el documento es publicado por sociedades filiales y/o sucursales de AXA Investment Managers Paris, S.A. en sus respectivos países.

    Este documento ha sido distribuido por AXA Investment Managers Paris, S.A., Sucursal en España, inscrita en el registro de sucursales de sociedades gestoras del EEE de la CNMV con el número 38 y con domicilio en Paseo de la Castellana 93, Planta 6 - 28046 Madrid (Madrid).»     

    © AXA Investment Managers Paris, S.A. 2023. Todos los derechos reservados.

    Advertencia sobre riesgos

    El valor de las inversiones y las rentas derivadas de ellas pueden disminuir o aumentar y es posible que los inversores no recuperen la cantidad invertida originalmente.

    Volver arriba
    Clientes Profesionales

    El sitio web de AXA INVESTMENT MANAGERS Paris Sucursal en España está destinado exclusivamente a clientes profesionales tal y como son Definidos en la Directiva 2014/65/EU (directiva sobre Mercados de Instrumentos financieros) y en los artículos 194 y 196 de la Ley 6/2023, de 17 de marzo, de los Mercados de Valores y de los Servicios de Inversión. Para una mayor información sobre la disponibilidad de los fondos AXA IM, por favor consulte con su asesor financiero o diríjase a la página web de la CNMV www.cnmv.es

    Por la presente confirmo que soy un inversor profesional en el sentido de la legislación aplicable.

    Entiendo que la información proporcionada tiene únicamente fines informativos y no constituye una solicitud ni un asesoramiento de inversión.

    Confirmo que poseo los conocimientos, experiencia y aptitudes necesarios en materia de inversión, y que comprendo los riesgos asociados a los productos de inversión, tal como se definen en las normas aplicables en mi jurisdicción.